

# Nuts and Bolts of Enhanced Security Management for Tru64 UNIX

**Martin Moore**

Team Leader, Tru64 UNIX Support  
HP Services



# Session topics

## ■ Topics

- Overview – what is Enhanced Security?
- Enhanced Security architecture
- Configuring Enhanced Security features
- Additional Tru64 UNIX security features
- Q & A

## ■ Not a topic

- Hardening system for maximum security
  - See session 2139, “Securing Tru64 UNIX Step by Step”

# What is Enhanced security?

- Optional OS subsets (OSFC2SECnnn and OSFXC2SECnnn) that provide additional, configurable security features
- No extra license needed
- Can be configured to reach the C2 class of trust defined by TCSEC (US)
- Also meets the F-C2 functional class defined by ITSEC (EU)

# Security classes (lowest to highest)

TCSEC (US)	ITSEC (EU)	TCSEC definition
D	-	Minimal security
C1	E1, F-C1	Discretionary security protection
C2	E2, F-C2	Controlled access protection
B1	E3, F-B1	Labeled protection
B2	E4, F-B2	Structured protection
B3	E5, F-B3	Security domains
A1	E6, F-B3	Verified design

# Enhanced security architecture

- Security Integration Architecture (SIA)
- Enhanced security daemon (prpasswd)
- Authentication database

# Security Integration Architecture (SIA)

- O/S layer that provides interface to code that depends on security mechanisms: user authentication, password changes, etc.
- Controlled by */etc/sia/matrix.conf* – defines which libraries to use for security-dependent calls (e.g. changing password)
- Changing security level changes *matrix.conf*
  - Some layered products (DCE, ASU) also modify the file
- SIA log file (*/var/adm/sialog*) records SIA activity (e.g., su's) – touch the file to start logging
- Can be used to customize security-sensitive commands
  - See Security manual chapter 20 for much more info

# Sample matrix.conf file

```
siad_setgrent=(BSD,libc.so)
siad_endgrent=(BSD,libc.so)
siad_getgrent=(BSD,libc.so)
siad_getgrnam=(BSD,libc.so)
siad_getgrgid=(BSD,libc.so)
siad_setpwent=(BSD,libc.so)
siad_endpwent=(BSD,libc.so)
siad_getpwent=(BSD,libc.so)
siad_getpwnam=(BSD,libc.so)
siad_getpwuid=(BSD,libc.so)
siad_init=(OSFC2,/usr/shlib/libsecurity.so)
siad_chg_finger=(OSFC2,/usr/shlib/libsecurity.so)
siad_chg_password=(OSFC2,/usr/shlib/libsecurity.so)
siad_chg_shell=(OSFC2,/usr/shlib/libsecurity.so)
...etc.
```

# Enhanced security daemon

- */usr/sbin/prpasswd*
- Introduced in V5 to handle writes to security databases, avoiding file lock contention
- Two instances (parent and child) should be running at all times
- If you're having unexplained login problems in V5 Enhanced security, try restarting prpasswd:

```
# /sbin/init.d/prpasswd restart
```

(Note: two "d"s in daemon name, only one in script name.)



# Authentication database

- A set of five component databases that contain all Enhanced Security information (man page: *authcap(4)*)
  - Protected password
  - Terminal control
  - System default
  - Device assignment
  - File control
- Use *edauth(8)* to manipulate databases
- Other useful commands:
  - *authck(8)*: check database consistency
  - *convauth(8)*: convert old (pre-V4) database to new
  - *convuser(8)*: convert profile from Base to Enhanced

# Authentication database components

- Protected password database – *prpasswd(4)*
  - User profile and password information
  - */tcb/files/auth.db* (UID 0-99)
  - */var/tcb/files/auth.db* (UID 100+)
  - Fields begin with “u\_”
- Terminal control database – *ttys(4)*
  - Terminal login control profile
  - */etc/auth/system/ttys.db*
  - Fields begin with “t\_”

# Auth database components (cont.)

- System default database – default(4)
  - System-wide security defaults
  - Default values for fields in other components
  - */etc/auth/system/default*
  - System-wide default fields begin with “d\_”
  - “t\_”, “u\_”, and “v\_” fields may also appear
- Device assignment database – devassign(4)
  - Login control for terminals and X devices
  - */etc/auth/system/devassign*
  - Fields begin with “v\_”

# Auth database components (cont.)

- File control database – files(4)
  - Maintains system file integrity
  - */etc/auth/system/files*
  - Fields begin with “f\_”
- Each component database is a set of entries (e.g., `prpasswd` contains one entry for each user)
- Each entry consists of the entry name, one or more data fields, and the end-of-entry field “`chkent`”

# Authentication database format



- Fields are colon-separated, and one of 3 types:
  - Integer: `<name>#<value>` `u_id#115`
  - String: `<name>=<value>` `u_name=martin`
  - Boolean: `<name>` (if true) `u_lock`  
`<name>@` (if false) `u_lock@`

- Example:

```
# edauth -g -dt console
console:\
:t_devname=console:t_uid=root:\
:t_logtime#1053073399:chkent:
```

(Last login on console was by root at time 1053073399.)

# Authentication database format (cont.)

- Some integer values are time values
  - Duration in seconds (1 day = 86400 sec)
  - Absolute times (seconds since start of 1970)
    - “1053073399” (previous slide) = 08:23:19 GMT, 16 May 03
    - Time value of zero means never or infinity
  - Kdbx macro “ctime” translates into meaningful format:

```
# echo "ctime 1053073399" | kdbx -k /vmunix \  
| tail -1
```

```
<cr><cr>
```

```
Fri May 16 03:23:19 EST 2003
```

# Enhanced security features

- Distributed passwords (aka shadow passwords)
- Login controls
- Password controls
- Account templates

# Shadow passwords

- By default, encrypted passwords are visible in world-readable */etc/passwd*; open to crack attack
- Shadow passwords are encrypted passwords in a non-visible location (prpasswd database)
- V5 provides ability to easily select shadow passwords without other C2 features



# Login controls

- Recording of last terminal and time of last successful login and last login failure
- Account disabled after too many consecutive failures; limit configurable on a per-user basis
- Similar lockout configurable per terminal
- Minimum time between login attempts
- Maximum time for login attempt to complete
- Day/time login restrictions for individual users
- Account lifetime (account retired when reached)

# Password controls

- Maximum (up to 80) and minimum password length
- Password expiration time (if not changed in this time, must be changed at next login)
- Password lifetime (if not changed in this time, account disabled)
- System-generated (several flavors) passwords or user-chosen passwords, configurable per user
- Password history to prevent re-use (depth configurable per user)

# Password controls (cont.)

- Optional triviality checks – built-in & site-specified
- Built-in: see *acceptable\_password(3)* man page
  - No palindromes, login or group names, or English words
  - Controlled by `u_restrict`
- Site-specified: see */tcb/bin/pwpolicy* comments
  - `pwpolicy` is template/placeholder
  - Specify your own callout script with `secconfig`
  - Controlled by `u_policy`

# Locked, disabled, and retired accounts

- Locked – administratively locked by superuser
- Retired – account is terminated, will never be used again
- Locked and retired accounts are both disabled; “disabled” simply means that user can’t log in
- Accounts are also disabled by system for violating limits, e.g., too many login failures
- Locked account must be unlocked by superuser
- Retired account can’t be unretired (in strict C2)

# Locked, disabled, and retired (cont.)



- *dxaccounts(8)* indicates these states as follows:
  - Locked: Padlock
  - Retired: Red “No” symbol (circle + diagonal line)
  - Disabled by system: Red circle + white X (V5.1 & up)
- Admin can re-enable disabled accounts, or set a grace period for users to login and remove disabling condition
  - # `usermod -x grace_limit=1 <username>`  
(sets grace period of 1 day for disabled user)
- Or you can remove the disabling condition with `edauth`
  - Example: set `u_numunsuclog` to zero to clear count of unsuccessful login attempts

# “Account is disabled” causes

- This message at login can mean any of the following:
  - Administrative lock (“u\_lock” present in profile)
  - User on vacation (defined by u\_vacation)
  - Password lifetime exceeded
    - Time of last successful password change (u\_succhg) is more than <u\_life> seconds in the past
  - Account inactive too long
    - Last successful login (u\_suclog) is more than <u\_max\_login\_intvl> seconds in the past
  - Too many login failures
    - Number of failures (u\_numunsuclog) equals or exceeds maximum number of login attempts (u\_maxtries)
    - Automatic reset after <u\_unlock> seconds

# Configuring Enhanced security

- Ensure subsets are installed
- Run “*sysman secconfig*” (V5) or “*secsetup*” (V4)
- Choose ENHANCED
- Choose Enhanced security profile (V5)
  - SHADOW (Shadow passwords only)
  - UPGRADE (During rolling cluster upgrade only)
  - CUSTOM (Customize enhanced features)
- Reboot needed to switch from Base to Enhanced

# Customizing Enhanced security features

- CUSTOM defaults:
  - Login successes and failures are logged
  - Null passwords are not allowed
  - Password expiration = 26 weeks
  - Password lifetime = 52 weeks
- Selecting CUSTOM brings you to Custom Options screen to customize common features
  - Leave “Password Encryption Algorithm” set to “BigCrypt”
- Must edit database (*edauth*) for uncommon ones



# Customizing system options

- secconfig screen to enable/disable additional security features:
  - Segment sharing
  - Execute bit set only by root
  - Access Control Lists (ACL's)
- Not technically part of Enhanced Security – independent of security level and of each other
- More on these later

# Enhanced security performance

- For the most part, no difference in performance
- Kernel overhead is negligible
- Exception: database updates to record login attempts, especially if numerous and/or frequent logins
- Tradeoff: selectively disable some logging to improve performance (at the expense of security)
  - Logins by terminal (success or failure)
  - Successful logins for user
  - Login failures for each user

# Enhanced security and NIS

- Protected password database can be NIS-served
  - Restrictions in mixed-OS NIS environments
- The same NIS domain can include both base and enhanced security clients
- A bit tricky to set up; see Security manual chapter 9
- Logging of login attempts caused a potential performance bottleneck in V4; also requires NIS master to always be up
- In V5, logging can be disabled (see previous slide) to avoid these problems

# Enhanced security in clusters

- All members must be at the same security level
- Tricky in V4 (TCR 1.x), particularly before 4.0F
- Much easier in V5
- **Strongly recommend** configuring Enhanced security on first member before creating cluster
- To upgrade existing cluster, go to UPGRADE and reboot each member in turn
- Then go to SHADOW or CUSTOM and finish configuration

# Enhanced security “gotchas”

- 4.0F -> 5.0A update installation has problems with Enhanced security
  - See fix and instructions in 5.0A patch kit
  - Or: go back to Base security during the upgrade
  - Or: avoid this upgrade path if possible
    - Use 4.0F -> 4.0G -> 5.1 -> 5.1B rather than 4.0F -> 5.0A -> 5.1A -> 5.1B
- Authentication database changes are logged in */var/tcb/files/dblogs*
  - If not pruned, could eventually fill up /var
    - Sysman secconfig provides option to schedule a cron job to prune log files
  - See Security manual ch. 6 for security database utilities

## Gotchas, cont.

- Base security encrypts first 8 characters of password only; Enhanced encrypts entire string
  - In older versions: after switching to Enhanced, log in with only first 8 characters if using a longer password
  - In recent versions, system handles transition correctly via `u_oldcrypt` and `u_newcrypt` (**don't modify these!**)
  - When running `sysman secconfig`, leave “Password Encryption Algorithm” option set to **“BigCrypt”**

# Administration tools

- Several options exist for day-to-day account management (creating, modifying, locking, etc.):
- Account Manager GUI (*dxaccounts*)
- Sysman accounts (GUI or character cell)
  - Similar to *dxaccounts*, but less powerful
- Command line utilities
  - *useradd, usermod, userdel*
  - *groupadd, groupmod, groupdel*
- For low-level manipulation of databases, use *edauth*

# Other security features

- Segment sharing
- Execute bit protection
- Access Control Lists (ACL's)
- Division of Privilege (DoP)
- Auditing
- Secure Console



# Segment sharing

- Page table sharing allows other processes to read text segments (not data) of shared libraries – regardless of their file permissions
- Almost always a non-issue
- Enabled by default; leave it enabled unless you **KNOW** you need to disable it
- Disabling causes all processes to load private copies of all shared libraries
  - Consumes vast amounts of memory, leading to performance degradation

# Execute bit protection

- Feature added in V5 to prevent non-root users from creating executables (e.g., on firewall systems)
- When enabled, non-root users can't set execute permission bits on any file, even their own
- Disabled by default
- Kernel parameter "noadd\_exec\_access" in vfs subsystem; 0 = disabled, 1 = enabled
- Reboot needed to change state

# Access control lists (ACL's)

- Increased granularity of access control beyond traditional UNIX user/group/other scheme
- In V5, controlled by parameter “acl\_mode” in sec subsystem; can be enabled/disabled dynamically
- *getacl(1)*, *setacl(1)* to display/control ACL's; *dxsetacl(8X)* for graphical interface
- An ACL consists of access control entries for users, groups, and other

# Example ACL

```
# ls -l test  
-rw-r--r--    1 martin    unix    0 Aug 27 10:43 test
```

```
# file: test
```

```
# owner: martin
```

```
# group: unix
```

```
#
```

```
user::rw-
```

← same as “user” bits in ls -l

```
user:hancock:rw-
```

```
user:ellis:---
```

```
group::r--
```

← same as “group” bits in ls -l

```
group:staff:r--
```

```
other::r--
```

← same as “other” bits in ls -l

# ACL's (cont.)

- Multiple entry resolution
  - User entry supersedes group entry
  - User in multiple groups gets all their privileges
- Directories have up to 3 different ACL's
  - Access (controls access to directory)
  - Default access (inherited by new files)
  - Default directory (inherited by new directories)
- ACL's are stored in property lists; dump and vdump backup and restore these properly

# ACL's and NFS

- Server and client must both have ACL's enabled
  - As such, won't work in mixed-vendor configurations
  - Parameter `nfs_flatten_mode` (in `sec` subsystem) defines interpretation of ACL's to NFS V2 clients
- Server must run the property list daemon, *proplisd(8)*
- Client must mount with “proplist” option. An entry in `/etc/fstab` might look like this:

```
students:/home /nfs_home nfs rw,proplist 0 0
```

# Division of Privilege

- Traditional UNIX privileges are all-or-nothing
- *dop(8)* allows you to grant privileges for specific operations to users or groups
- Introduced in V4, but only for system use; not really usable for admins until V5
- Over 20 pre-defined privilege classes, e.g. AccountManagement to add/modify/delete users
- You can define your own privileges (a bit tricky)
- *Sysman dopconfig* for configuration and help

# Auditing

- Auditing lets you track system events down to the system call level
- *Sysman auditconfig* to configure
  - Several pre-defined audit profiles, e.g., Desktop, NIS Server, Timesharing, etc.
- *dxaudit(8X)*, *auditd(8)*, *audit\_tool(8)* to manage
- Object selection allows you to focus on specific files
- Audit only what you really want to look at!
  - Too much can drown you in data
  - Does have a performance impact



# Secure console mode

- Actually two modes – one software, one firmware
- Firmware: set console password and “SECURE” console variable (available on most Alphas)
  - Allows only regular boot from default device
- Software: SECURE\_CONSOLE variable in */etc/rc.config*
  - YES: requires root password to enter single-user
  - NO: enters single-user mode without password
  - Not set: depends on SECURE console variable
- For more details, see *sulogin(8)* man page



# HP WORLD 2003

Solutions and Technology Conference & Expo

Interex, Encompass and HP bring you a powerful new HP World.

