



What Can Go Wrong During a Pen-Test?

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Terms

- Zero Knowledge
- Exploit
- 0-Day
- Vulnerability
- Assessment
- Audit
- Test



How Systems Are Compromised??




Chart for illustration only, not based on study data

Typical Pen-Testing Methodology

- Footprinting
 - Discovery phase
 - How an attacker learns about a network.
 - Compared to a burglar “casing” a retail establishment. determine active devices and what services are running on those device. "doorknob rattling"
- Reconnaissance
 - Researching the target network and systems using publicly available information.
 - American Registry for Internet Numbers (ARIN), and WHOIS for technical information related to DNS and network addressing.
 - Google search engine
- Enumeration
 - Expanding a folder or a service to obtain more details.
 - For example, after discovering a Windows NT domain, identifying a list of user accounts, shares, groups etc. for a particular device or network.
- Exploitation
 - Can involve “brute force” guessing of passwords
 - Tools and utilities are used to gain control of the system and/or network.

An Example of “Information Leakage”

```
cschieke@somehost cschieke]$ telnet www.BigCo.com 80
```

```
Trying www.BigCo.com...
```

```
Connected to BigCo.com on Port 80
```

```
Escape character is '^['.
```

```
HEAD /
```

```
HTTP/1.1 401 Access Denied
```

```
Server: Microsoft-IIS/5.0
```

```
Date: Thu, 19 Jun 2003 16:00:39 GMT
```


```
WWW-Authenticate: Basic realm="10.1.1.6"
```

```
Content-Length: 4431
```

```
Content-Type: text/html
```


Application Security

- Input Validation
 - SQL Injection
 - Off-by-one
 - Integers
- Session
 - Session Fixation
 - Timeout
 - Weak ID's
- Access Control
 - Weak Enforcement
 - Privilege Leaks
 - Implemented?



Measuring Business Value

- Inadequate ways to quantify results:
 - We exploited 100 Systems
 - We compromised 500 Gig of Critical Business Data
 - We found 1000 High Risk Vulnerabilities
- Qualifying more appropriate
 - Security Infrastructure ineffective at stopping attacks
 - Business data obtained using commonly available tools
 - Avoid: “It was easy”



Return on Investment

- Classic ROI doesn't work
- Does the Classic Definition Apply?
 - A. "We saved over \$100,000 in carrier costs by switching to IPsec VPN"
 - B. "We saved over \$100,000,000.00 by finding and fixing vulnerabilities in the transaction processing system"
 - C. "We saved our business by having a penetration test"

Please select the one that is most accurate?

	'97	'98	'99	'00	'01	'02
Theft of proprietary info.	\$20,048,000	\$33,545,000	\$42,496,000	\$66,708,000	\$151,238,100	\$170,827,000
Sabotage	\$4,285,850	\$2,142,000	\$4,421,000	\$27,148,000	\$5,183,000	\$17,134,000
Telecom eavesdropping	\$1,181,000	\$562,000	\$765,000	\$991,200	\$886,000	\$3,015,000
Outsider penetration	\$2,911,700	\$1,637,000	\$2,885,000	\$7,104,000	\$19,085,500	\$13,055,000
Insider abuse Net	\$1,006,750	\$3,720,000	\$7,576,000	\$27,984,740	\$35,001,650	\$50,099,000
Financial fraud	\$24,892,000	\$11,239,000	\$39,706,000	\$55,996,000	\$92,935,500	\$115,753,000
Denial of service	n/a	\$2,787,000	\$3,255,000	\$8,247,500	\$4,283,500	\$18,370,500
Spoofing	\$512,000	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a	n/a
Virus	\$12,498,150	\$7,874,000	\$5,274,000	\$29,171,700	\$45,288,150	\$49,979,000
Unauthorized insider	\$3,991,605	\$50,565,000	\$3,567,000	\$22,554,500	\$6,064,000	\$4,503,000
Telecom fraud	\$22,860,300	\$17,256,000	\$773,000	\$4,028,000	\$9,041,000	\$346,000
Active wiretapping	n/a	\$245,000	\$20,000	\$5,000,000	\$0	\$0
Laptop theft	\$6,132,200	\$5,250,000	\$13,038,000	\$10,404,300	\$8,849,000	\$11,766,500
Total	\$100,119,555	\$136,822,000	\$123,799,000	\$265,586,240	\$377,828,700	\$455,848,000
Grand total of Losses reported (1997-2001): \$1,459,925,495						

Managing Risk

- Some Facts We Can All Agree on:
 - All businesses can expect some “loss” also known as “the cost of doing business”
 - Some businesses are not tolerant of loss in certain areas



Wise businesses choose which losses are acceptable!

My Life as a Fortune Teller!

- Perception

- This system may be vulnerable, based on the software version number being displayed
- No known exploits

- Conclusion

- I'm safe

- Reality:

- This system has a vulnerability
- There are tools available on the Internet to exploit this vulnerability

- Conclusion

- You are not safe

What is being tested?

- Are trying to prove a negative?

“I tried to compromise your systems and was able to do so.”

Your systems are not secure

“I tried to compromise your systems and was unable to do so.”

Your systems are secure

Risks in Penetration Testing

- Your systems could **crash**
- You could **lose** business data
- You could miss a **real** penetration
- Someone could follow your incident response procedures (and **call law enforcement**)
- You could remain **unaware** about real vulnerabilities in your environment



When is Ethical Hacking Needed?

- Periodic Checkups
 - Quarterly vulnerability scans
 - After significant change
 - Legacy systems that are not closely monitored
- Investigation of critical applications and systems
 - Where is the most risk?
 - Who has reviewed the effectiveness of controls? (from the technical perspective)
- 3rd Party Vendors/Suppliers
 - Do they connect to your network?
 - Do they handle YOUR DATA?

Questions to ask a Pen-test team

- Do they hire former hackers?
- How do they store engagement data?
- How do they dispose of engagement data?
- Do they perform background checks?
- How do they collect exploits?
- How do they train their staff?
- Do they test exploits in a lab?

Steps to Managing a Pen Test

- Clearly **define** objectives
- Schedule **frequent** status updates
- **Supervise** closely
- Request **raw** data
- Inform internal security **monitoring** group*
- **Review** results with team (**before end of test**)

will leak info in a zero-knowledge effort,
but worth it!

Examples of what can go wrong!

- Please don't call the Cops!!
- Yes sir, that was me that caused 450 calls to the help desk.
- Ooops – that's not **your** system?
- Here you go, here's your hard-drive back.
- “Hello, yes, Do You Speak English”?

Questions?

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